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Abstract 
 
We use data for a panel of 60 countries over the period 1980-2005 to investigate the main 
drivers of the likelihood of structural reforms. We find that: (i) external debt crises are the 
main trigger of financial and banking reforms; (ii) inflation and banking crises are the key 
drivers of external capital account reforms; (iii) banking crises also hasten financial reforms; 
and (iv) economic recessions play an important role in promoting the necessary consensus for 
financial, capital, banking and trade reforms, especially in the group of OECD-countries. 
Additionally, we also observe that the degree of globalisation is relevant for financial reforms, 
in particular in the group of non-OECD countries. Moreover, an increase in the income gap 
accelerates the implementation of structural reforms, but increased political fragmentation 
does not seem to have a significant impact. 
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1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008-2009, the political agenda was 
dominated by the need to design a response aimed at promoting the economic recovery in the 
short-term. As financial conditions started to improve, and general economic activity began to 
show signs of stabilization, policy measures shifted towards a focus on strengthening 
resilience. Not surprisingly, the implementation of structural reforms is nowadays seen as an 
important mean for dealing with the negative effects of market failures and the dangers of an 
opaque regulatory environment, as well as creating the necessary conditions to sustain growth 
in the medium-term. 
In this context, the existing literature suggests that countries are typically induced to 
implement structural reforms when confronted with a deterioration in economic conditions, 
i.e. the so called “crisis-induces-reform hypothesis” (Drazen and Grilli, 1993). From a 
theoretical point of view, crisis episodes are seen as pre-requisites for reform efforts (Bates 
and Krueger, 1993) or regarded as extreme cases of policy failures (Rodrik, 1996). From an 
historical perspective, the number of crises experienced by many countries seems to support 
the argument that crisis episodes facilitate the implementation of structural reforms (Lora and 
Olivera, 2004; Drazen and Easterly, 2001).   
Another strand of the literature highlights the role played by economic growth at 
fostering structural reforms. For instance, Aghion and Blanchard (1994) show that the 
restructuring of the state sector depends on labour market conditions. Campos and Horváth 
(2012a) also emphasize the importance of economic conditions in driving internal and 
external liberalization reforms and the process of privatization. 
Additionally, a number of external, institutional and political factors have been put 
forward as helping to explain the incentives for reforms. For instance, external aid, whether in 
the form of a financial assistance program or as part of a sovereign debt restructuring, is 
normally conditional on the implementation of a series of structural reforms (Drazen, 2000; 
Fernandez-Arias and Montiel, 2001). Similarly, poor quality of institutions and political 
fragmentation may deter the course of structural reforms either because of power to block 
reform legislation (Roubini and Sachs, 1989a), due to the political resistance to changes in the 
policy process (Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Rodrik, 2000) or even as a reflex of the 
distributional conflicts at the time of reforms (Rodrik, 1994). 
Despite this, the empirical evidence on the “crisis-induces-reform hypothesis” is still 
scarce or limited to a number of works that provide, at most, some insights on the regulatory 
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policy response to crisis episodes (Nelson, 1990; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992), rather than a 
full assessment of the main drivers of the likelihood of structural reforms. 
In this paper, we try to fill the above-mentioned gaps in the literature while answering 
the following questions: (i) Do crises episodes operate as catalysts of structural reforms? (ii) 
How important are economic conditions at explaining the implementation of structural 
reforms? (iii) Can globalisation boost the likelihood of structural reforms? (iv) What is the 
role played by the political setup? 
Using a logistic regression and annual data for 60 countries over the period 1980-
2005, we show that crisis episodes tend to accelerate the implementation of structural 
reforms. In particular, external debt crises are the main trigger of financial, banking and trade 
reforms. Inflation and banking crises are key drivers of external capital account reforms. 
Banking crises also exert an important effect over financial reforms.   
Additionally, the empirical findings suggest that a higher degree of globalisation is 
positively related with most of the reforms implemented by the economies analysed in this 
study.  
Moreover, our findings also show mixed results regarding the intensity of 
distributional conflicts: a higher degree of inequality pushes forward some reforms, but the 
fractionalization of the political system is not relevant in the process (with the exception of 
product market reforms).   
Our results are robust even after controlling for the GDP growth and the inflation rate, 
which has proven to have no significant impact on the kind of reforms analysed in this study 
(except the positive influence of inflation in fostering capital account restrictions). 
We also find that the degree of globalization and the occurrence of crisis episodes are 
more relevant for the reform effort in non-OECD than in OECD countries. In this last group, 
recessions are a key catalyst of reforms. 
Finally, the empirical evidence reveals that negative changes in the reform indices are 
better described as “structural reversals” and not as overshoots of the welfare-optimizing 
points. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 looks at the related literature. 
Section 3 presents the econometric methodology. Section 4 describes the data. Section 5 
discusses the empirical results. Section 6 provides the sensitivity analysis. Finally, Section 7 
concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
A large body of empirical literature considers crises episodes as the key drivers of 
policy reforms. Haggard and Maxfield (1996) argue that, in response to declining exchange 
rates, governments are likely to adopt liberal capital account policies to encourage foreign 
capital owners to resume investment. When capital inflows subsequently resume, exchange 
rates recover and domestic financial difficulties ease. Similarly, Simmons and Elkins (2004) 
find a significant and positive effect of currency crises on capital account openness. 
Moreover, financial liberalization measures consisting of the relaxation of borrowing 
constraints and the lift of restrictions on cross-border financial transactions often strengthen 
financial development and contribute to stronger investment and higher long-run growth. The 
positive direct effect of structural reforms on growth significantly outweighs the growth loss 
associated with the excessive risk-taking phenomenon induced by liberalization (Ranciere et 
al., 2006).
1
  
Accordingly, countries are typically induced to reform when confronted with 
deteriorated economic conditions. Episodes of recessions, hyperinflation, fiscal and external 
imbalances are likely to help removing obstacles to policy changes and to induce reform 
opportunities (Nelson, 1990; Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Bates 
and Krueger, 1993; Haggard and Webb, 1994; Williamson and Haggard, 1994). Jong-A-Ping 
and De Haan (2007) also show that economic reforms lead to accelerations in economic 
growth and these are more likely when political regimes change.  
From a theoretical standpoint, economic stagnation or poor economic prospects that 
turn into “crises” are seen as pre-requisites for reform efforts. Putting it differently, reforms 
are not needed when economic conditions are satisfactory (Bates and Krueger, 1993). Indeed, 
one of the most prominent theoretical argument in favour of the so called “reform-induced 
crisis hypothesis” concentrates on the public perception of the need of reforms (Williamson, 
1994). Only when the economic situation gets quite bad do policymakers realize that there is a 
permanent problem that requires a major policy change rather than a transitory solution 
(Tommasi and Velasco, 1996). Along the same line, Rodrik (1994) argues that a crisis can be 
regarded as an extreme case of policy failure. Thus, if an economy in crisis has not yet 
reformed, this is because the crisis has not become severe enough. Grier and Sutter (2007) 
suggest that countries adopt policy reforms in order to increase the returns of and to stimulate 
_____________________________ 
1 Bekaert et al. (2005) find that stock market liberalization leads to an increase of one percentage point on 
average GDP growth. Levchenko et al. (2010) also uncover positive growth effects when analyzing industry 
level data. At the firm level, this result is confirmed by Henry (2007) who shows that that financial reforms lead 
to investment booms associated with declining capital costs.  
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foreign direct investment. Campos et al. (2010) argue that, more than economic crises, 
political crises are crucial for structural reforms. Following Rodrik (1996), the authors‟ 
reasoning is that, by triggering a re-alignment of the different social groups, political 
considerations act as catalysts for burden-sharing agreements and, thus, contribute more 
significantly to the implementation of structural reforms. In addition, they show that, given 
that labour market liberalisation may be considered more threatening to a larger faction of the 
population than trade reforms, the impact of political crises tends to be smaller in the case of 
labour market reforms than for trade reforms. Golinelli and Rovelli (2013) also suggest that 
the support to structural reforms by citizens is stronger when the economic growth increases 
and the unemployment rate falls.  
Even though crises create conditions under which policymakers are encouraged to 
undertake extensive policy switches, their effect in stimulating reforms crucially depends on 
how complex it is to implement them. In particular, the arguments in favour of the “crisis-
reform” linkages may be weakened when the net cost of reforming is taken into account. 
Thus, as argued by Drazen (2000), crises may stimulate reforms because the costs of 
eliminating their causes are low and the benefits are high. 
From a historical perspective, the number of crises experienced by many advanced 
and emerging countries over the last four decades and the variety of regulatory responses to 
them seem to corroborate the view that crises ease the implementation of reforms (Lora and 
Olivera, 2004; OECD, 2010).   
Nevertheless, the empirical evidence on the “crisis-induced reform” hypothesis is still 
scarce. So far, only a limited number of works managed to provide insights on the regulatory 
response to crises and even fewer of them have looked at the policy reform areas in which 
governments change their reaction to this type of events (Nelson, 1990; Haggard and 
Kaufman, 1992). Abiad and Mody (2005) find that crisis episodes induce more regulation and 
fewer reforms. In particular, while balance-of-payments crises spur reforms, banking crises 
lead to liberalization reversals. Shehzad and De Haan (2009) uncover a negative relationship 
between financial reforms and the likelihood of systemic crises, conditional on an adequate 
banking supervision. By contrast, the probability of the occurrence of non-systemic crises 
rises after the implementation of financial reforms. Agnello et al. (2014a) also show that debt 
crises promote financial reforms. Babecky and Campos (2011) argue that the inconsistent 
measurement of reforms can explain the lack of robustness regarding the growth effects of 
reforms. Campos and Horváth (2012b) examine empirically the determinants of reform 
reversals. In particular, the authors show that a rise in OECD growth makes external 
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liberalization reversals more likely to take place. In the light of “imperfections” displayed by 
institutions, some authors have also highlighted the need to redefine economic development 
as being a mix between economic growth and adequate changes in the institutional framework 
aimed at guaranteeing a sustainable growth (Toye, 1995; Eggertsson, 2005). 
Generally, what emerges from this literature is that the crises‟ characteristics 
significantly affect the nature and the composition of the reforms. In particular, trade and 
labour-market reforms are more likely to be prompted by sharp falls in growth and income, 
while financial reforms tend to follow bouts of high and, especially, volatile inflation, and 
fiscal crises favour tax reforms (Williamson, 1994; Rodrik, 1994; Elmeskov et al., 1998; 
Drazen, 2000; IMF, 2004; Boeri et al., 2006). Duval (2008) shows that sound public finances 
and fiscal expansions foster reforms, with the effect of these being larger for countries with 
fixed exchange-rate regimes. Wiese (2014) combine a structural break filter and the validation 
of the structural breaks identified using de jure evidence of reforms in the healthcare sector 
and find robust evidence of the “reform-induced crisis hypothesis”. However, the authors 
show that political factors do not have a significant impact on this type of reforms. 
Friedrichsen and Zahn (2014) argue that the economic performance of a country matters even 
beyond personal economic outcomes. Thus, growing dissatisfaction or lack of political 
support in hard times typically reflects poor economic conditions and unemployment. 
In what concerns the evidence from the debt crises experienced by advanced and 
emerging countries over the last decades, it suggests that, in most of the cases, the linkages 
with the implementation of structural reforms crucially depends on whether these are oriented 
towards sustaining high growth rates in the medium-term and increasing competition in 
product and labour markets (Nicoletti and Scarpetta, 2003). For instance, some authors 
uncover the existence of a negative relationship between economic performance and wage 
rigidities (Bruno, 1986), which appears to be particularly strong in Europe (Koedijk and 
Kremers, 1996). If past experience provides any guidance for the future, the recent sovereign 
debt crisis in many EMU countries should indeed serve as a catalyst for reforms. 
With regard to economic recessions, Lora and Olivera (2004) find that falling per 
capita income is the best predictor of economic liberalization as measured by an index of 
reform which includes financial, labour, privatization, tax and trade reforms. Using a set of 
structural reform indicators for about 20 Latin American countries over the period 1985-1995, 
the authors show that crises that are characterized by real income falls and negative growth 
rates facilitate the adoption of trade reforms (and, to a lesser extent, labour reforms), while 
inflationary crises tend to be associated with financial reforms. In the same vein, Alesina and 
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Drazen (1991) and Drazen and Grilli (1993) argue that growth deceleration may facilitate 
trade and tax reforms. 
As for hyper-inflation episodes, Drazen and Grilli (1993) argue that they provide the 
incentives for the resolution of social conflicts and, thus, facilitate the introduction of 
economic reforms and the achievement of higher levels of welfare. Alesina and Drazen 
(1991) and Drazen and Grilli (1993) find that periods of very high inflation can lead to 
financial reforms, while fiscal deficits facilitate tax reforms and privatizations. Bruno and 
Easterly (1996) show that countries experiencing hyper-inflation are more likely to undertake 
reforms aimed at achieving price stabilization than moderate-inflation countries. Moreover, 
the authors fail to find similar evidence of the “crisis-induced reform hypothesis” when the 
crisis is the outcome of a high current account deficit or budget deficit. Drazen and Easterly 
(2001) report that while hyper-inflation is followed by reforms, public deficit and external 
imbalances end up attracting foreign aid rather then spurring reforms. 
Despite the “crisis-reform” nexus discussed above, it is not sufficient to explain the 
incentive/opportunity to reform per se. Thus, the political economy literature sheds some light 
on a number of additional factors (mainly related to the external financing conditions and 
institutional and political settings) that may influence the likelihood of structural reforms. In 
this context, foreign financial assistance as typically provided in times of crises by 
international institutions such as the IMF or bilaterally agreed with foreign governments (e.g. 
Paris Club) is expected to stimulate reforms. However, as argued by Drazen (2000), Svensson 
(2000) and Fernandez-Arias and Montiel (2001), financial aid may significantly soften the 
effects of the crisis, thereby, encouraging governments to postpone the implementation of 
reforms, especially, those that are particularly challenging to implement (because of market 
rigidities or political resistance). 
In the case of the political and institutional factors, their influence on the policy 
processes has been extensively studied by Drazen (2000) and Rodrik (2000). For instance, 
Drazen (2000) points out that economic crises can overcome the resistance to reform by 
highlighting their need close to the opposition to the government. Rodrik (2000) argues that 
any kind of policy change significantly depend on the political regime. While in autocratic 
regimes (such as dictatorships) political opposition to reform is generally repressed, 
democratic regimes foster economic reforms (Haggard and Kaufman, 1992; Keeler, 1993; 
Fidrmuc, 2003). Alesina and Drazen (1991) also suggest that reforms are less likely to be 
implemented (or adopted with delays) in countries with more political fragmentation, where 
small parties can use their veto power to block reform legislation (Haggard and Webb, 1994; 
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Roubini and Sachs, 1989a; Lora, 2000). Similarly, Dollar and Svensson (2000) show that high 
ethnic fragmentation reduces the probability of a successful implementation of structural 
reforms. Along the same line, Chang (2001) shows that delays in the path for reform are 
explained by the need of the government to improve its reputation until the point that reforms 
are seen as credible, while Tornell (1998) focuses on disruptions between groups and models 
reforms as costly pre-emptive strikes by one group in the society. 
Other authors focus on the relationship between structural reforms (such as 
privatisations and deregulations) and political ideology, and seem to confirm that right-wing 
governments are more favourable to such adjustments - i.e. the so called „partisan effect‟ 
(Bortolotti et al., 2003; Bortolotti and Pinotti, 2008; Roberts and Saeed, 2012). Eichengreen 
and Wyplosz (1998) emphasize that poor public finances make governments less able to 
undertake structural reforms as a result of the unpopular fiscal adjustment measures that they 
need to put in place. Yet, financial crises can ease the implementation of fiscal and structural 
reforms. Persson and Tabellini (2000) show that structural changes towards an increase in 
fiscal discipline can be boosted by (constitutional) rules, especially, in the case of weak 
democratic governments. Saint-Paul (2000) highlights that, by reducing rents in one area (of 
the labour market), the support to structural reforms aimed at reducing such rents in other 
areas may be dampened. Pitlik and Wirth (2003) find that democratic regimes with 
fractionalised governments are more prone to have a positive impact on structural reforms. 
Mierau et al. (2007) suggest an important distinction between fast and slow fiscal 
adjustments. The authors find that while fast adjustments are only affected by future elections, 
gradual adjustments are more likely to take place during broad policy reforms. Agnello et al. 
(2014b) rely on a rare events logit model to assess the impact of fiscal consolidation on the 
likelihood of financial reforms. They show that spending-driven consolidation measures are 
more prone towards raising the probability of the implementation of financial reforms than 
tax-driven austerity measures. Agnello et al. (2014c) stress that despite the negative impact of 
tax-driven consolidations on unemployment, labour market flexibility can narrow down such 
effect. Efendic et al. (2011) rely on a meta-regression analysis to assess the linkages between 
institutions and economic performance. The authors find that, despite the pronounced 
heterogeneity, the bulk of the evidence suggests the existence of a positive relationship. 
Tavares (2007) reports an increase in trade liberalization reforms for countries with low 
quality of customs. De Jong and Bogmans (2011) show that corruption reduces international 
trade, but bribe paying to customs tends to have a positive effect on imports. Lavigne (2011) 
investigates the political and institutional determinants of the need of a fiscal adjustment, i.e. 
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a period of severe fiscal distress that signals a clear need for fiscal consolidation. The author 
shows that, in the case of developing countries, a high quality of institutions helps avoiding 
periods of fiscal distress. For developed economies, budgetary institutions such as fiscal 
performance management systems make fiscal adjustments more likely to occur when needed. 
Campos and Horváth (2012a) show that, together with the economic conditions, the level of 
democracy significantly drives structural reforms, such as internal and external liberalization 
reforms and privatizations. 
Another strand of the literature looks at the spatial aspects of policy adoption. For 
instance, Case et al. (1993), Grossback et al. (2004) and Volden (2006) suggest that 
geographically distant states with similar demographics, political ideologies and other 
characteristics tend to adopt similar policies. Acemoglu et al. (2005) find that policies and 
institutions where the benefits of the market orientation on countries‟ growth are more visible 
are also more likely to be implemented. Volden et al. (2008) present a model of learning and 
policy choice across governments which shows that policy diffusion generally arises via 
independent actions taken by governments that only learn from their own experiences. Buera 
et al. (2011) rely on a learning model to explain the transition of countries between regimes of 
state intervention and regimes of market orientation. The authors show that such dynamics 
crucially depends on policymakers‟ beliefs about the relative merits of the markets versus the 
state, which are influenced by past experience. Their evidence also supports the idea that 
countries which are slow to adopt market-oriented policies typically have policymakers who 
consider that the impact of these policies is country-specific. 
Social aspects have also become relevant if we consider the potential distributional 
effects of the reform process. Alesina and Drazen (1991) argue that reforms that are more 
subject to political debate (i.e., tax, labor and pension reforms as opposed to financial or trade 
reforms) are, in general, adopted with a delay. Rodrik (1994) has extensively studied the role 
of distributional conflict in the timing of reforms. In the author‟s view, the political cost of a 
reform is related to the amount of income that is redistributed among different groups, while 
the benefit comes from the efficiency gains that it produces. The ratio between costs and 
benefits reflects the degree of political inefficiency of the reform. Along the same line, 
Roubini and Sachs (1989b) argue that coalition governments are more prone towards higher 
levels of government spending than majority party governments. This is explained by the fact 
that parties in a coalition try to ensure higher outlays for their individual constituencies. This 
argument is assessed empirically by De Haan and Sturm (1997), but their evidence does not 
seem to support a significant effect of the power dispersion index on the growth rate of 
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government debt and the growth rate of government spending. More recently, Agnello et al. 
(2012) focus on the relationship between financial reforms and income distribution and find a 
significantly negative link. 
Finally, there is another line of investigation that emphasizes the fact that policies and 
reforms in one country impact other countries‟ policies and reforms and, thus, cannot be 
considered isolated. As pointed out by Fidrmuc and Karaja (2013), these works can be 
clustered into the concepts of reform “contagion”, “learning” and “snowballing”, where 
economic reforms are interlinked with waves of political liberalization. For instance, 
Meseguer (2006) suggests that the existence of a learning process whereby the outcome of 
reforms (such as central bank independence, IMF agreements, privatizations and trade 
liberalization) influences the expectations that policy makers have about the effects of similar 
reforms in their own country. Gassebner et al. (2011) highlight that reform spillovers induced 
by inter-jurisdictional competition due to factor mobility and cross-country trade and eased by 
cultural and geographic proximity imply that reforms in a specific countries are a function of 
reforms in other countries. Brezis and Verdier (2013) show that repressed citizens in a given 
country are more likely to migrate to neighbouring countries with democratic regimes which, 
in turn, increases the probability of political liberalization in the first country. Fidrmuc and 
Karaja (2013) find that informational spillovers facilitate economic and political 
liberalization. Elhorst et al. (2013) use an error-correction model within a dynamic spatial 
panel framework and show that the change in the liberalization index of a given country 
depends not only on the initial level of the index in that country (in line with the works of 
Abiad and Mody (2005) and Huang (2009)), but also on the financial reforms implemented by 
other countries (in accordance with the findings of Zandberg et al. (2012)). Moreover, the 
authors reject the hypothesis of convergence in the extent of financial liberalization among 
countries. 
We try to improve the existing literature along various dimensions. First, our research 
is related to the work of Abiad and Mody (2005), who focus on the drivers of (large) financial 
reforms and (large) financial reversals and, thus, consider their various components, such as 
credit and interest rate controls, entry barriers, international transactions, privatization and 
regulations. Instead, we assess the determinants of a broader set of structural reforms, namely, 
financial reforms (and their typologies, such as domestic finance reforms, external capital 
account reforms and banking sector reforms), trade reforms, capital account restrictions, 
labour market regulations and product market reforms. 
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Second, our work also builds on the “crisis-induces-reform hypothesis” (Drazen and 
Grilli, 1993). We do so by considering various typologies of crisis episodes, including debt 
crises (among which domestic debt crisis and external debt crisis), currency crises, inflation 
crises, and bank crises, as identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). Therefore, our paper is 
close in spirit with the work of Campos et al. (2010), who also argue that different types of 
crises have different impacts on the likelihood of structural reforms. 
Third, we evaluate the importance of economic conditions, but also a set of 
institutional and “political” catalysts of structural reforms. Consequently, we rely on the 
political and institutional data gathered by Beck et al. (2001). 
Finally, we also explore the concept of “structural reversals”, as captured by negative 
movement in the relevant structural reform indices, and investigate their main driving forces. 
As a result, our research is highly indebted to the works of Abiad and Mody (2005), Campos 
and Horváth (2012a, 2012b) and Campos and Coricelli (2012). 
 
3. Econometric Methodology 
We employ a logistic regression to assess the determinants of the likelihood of the 
implementation of a wide set of structural reforms (StruRef). More specifically, we consider 
the direct impact of crisis episodes (Crisis), economic (Econ) and political (Pol) variables and 
estimate the following model:
2
 
),Pol''EconCrisis()PolEcon,Crisis,|1StruRef(Prob φβαi    (1) 
where α, β and φ  are the vectors of the parameters to be estimated and )(  is the logistic 
function.
3
 
Given that we rely on panel data, the structural model can be written as: 
otherwise. 0 and  ,0StruRef  if  1StruRef
,'Pol'EcoCrisisStruRef
*
itit
itit
*
it

 ititi φβα
   
 (2) 
with i = 1, …, 61; t = 1980, …, 2005; i captures the unobserved individual effects; and it is 
the error term. 
 
_____________________________ 
2 For details on this binary choice model see, for example, Greene (2012, Ch. 17). 
3 We should note that, as probit models do not render themselves well to the fixed-effects treatment due to the 
incidental parameter problem (Wooldridge, 2002, Ch. 15, p. 484), we estimate a logit model with fixed-effects. 
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4. Data 
We start by using a panel dataset consisting of 213 advanced, developing and 
emerging countries. However, the presence of missing values for several variables and the 
limited time span of structural reform variables reduce the number of countries in the 
estimation to a range from 55 to 60 (depending on the type of reform) over the period 1980-
2005.
4
 Table 1 lists the countries included in the sample by set of regressions or type of 
structural reform. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
The data on the main dependent variables encompass the financial sector, the external 
environment, and the labour and the product markets and can be described as follows: 
 the financial sector comprises four main indices: domestic finance liberalization, 
banking liberalization, international capital flows liberalization and external capital 
account liberalization. The first two indices are the result of combining a set of other 
variables including banking supervision and regulation, credit controls, direct credit 
and reserve requirements, entry barriers, interest rate controls, privatization and 
securities markets. Each of these is coded from zero (fully repressed) to three (fully 
liberalized) and is, then, aggregated with equal weights to form domestic finance 
reforms and banking sector reforms. Together with the liberalization of international 
capital flows - which qualitatively measures the ease of restrictions of financial credits 
and personal capital transactions - we obtain an aggregate index of financial reforms 
(see Abiad and Mody (2005) and Abiad et al. (2008) for details). The external capital 
account liberalization measures the intensity of legal restrictions on the ability of 
residents (versus non-residents) to move capital into and out of a country. It is coded 
from zero (fully repressed) to 50 (fully liberalized) (Schindler (2009)). 
 the external environment captures information about average tariff rates. The index is 
normalized between zero (tariff rates of 60% or higher) and one (zero tariff rates) and 
comes from Clemens and Williamson (2004). 
_____________________________ 
4 It is important to highlight that one cannot completely eliminate the data selection problem. Indeed, this 
econometric issue may still be present because of the reduction in the sample size associated with missing 
values. For instance, poor quality of institutions may be associated with higher likelihood of crisis episodes. 
These two characteristics may, in turn, be more important in countries for which data are unavailble or difficult 
to collect. We thank an anonymous reviewer for emphasizing this relevant issue to us. 
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 the labour market flexibility index is a weighted average of the following variables: 
centralized collective bargaining, conscription, cost of hiring, hiring and firing 
regulations, hiring regulations, mandated cost of worker dismissal and minimum 
wage. It is standardized to a 0-10 scale, with higher values representing a more rigid 
labour market, and data are obtained from the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of 
the World (EFW). 
 the product market index corresponds to the degree of flexibility of agriculture, 
electricity and telecommunications. It comprises simplified versions of existing 
indices produced by the OECD and extended in non-OECD countries. Relevant data 
gathered by the OECD include an index of regulatory reform in the air passenger 
transport, electricity, gas, post, rail, road freight sectors and telecommunications 
(Conway and Nicoletti, 2006), and the OECD‟s Producer and Consumer Support 
Estimates of agricultural policies during 1986-2006 (which is published as a 
complement to the OECD report “Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries: 
Monitoring and Evaluation, 2007”). 
In order to be able to apply a logit model to this analysis, we start by noting that Abiad 
and Mody (2005) aggregate six dimensions of financial liberalization to obtain an overall 
index for each country in each year. By summing those six individual components, which can 
take on values between 0 and 3, the aggregate index of financial liberalization takes on values 
between 0 and 18. Then, the authors classify policy changes for each country-year into five 
categories: 1) large reversals, i.e. a decrease in the index of 3 or more points; 2) reversals, i.e. 
a decrease of 1 or 2 points; 3) status quo, i.e. a change in the index between -1 and 1; 4) 
reforms, i.e. an increase of 1 or 2 points; 4) large reforms, i.e. an increase of 3 or more points. 
Thus, reforms correspond to a change in the financial liberalization index of more than 1 point 
irrespective of its size on a scale ranging between 0 and 18. That amounts to about more than 
0.05 points on a 0-1 scale. Consequently, we follow the same approach. More specifically, 
each structural reform index is translated into a binary variable, where a positive movement of 
more than 0.05 points (in a 0-1 scale) denotes a reform. This implies that our analysis also 
imposes a threshold as to which changes of the index are non-trivial and qualify as a reform. 
Based on this identification, Table 2 shows the distribution of the various structural 
reforms considered in the analysis. It can be seen that domestic finance reforms, banking 
sector reforms and trade reforms are the most frequent ones with 18.0%, 17.3% and 14.8%, 
respectively, of the total number of episodes identified as structural reforms. By contrast, 
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external capital account reforms, financial reforms and capital account restrictions are the 
least frequent and account for 6.9%, 9.8% and 9.9% of the total number of structural reforms. 
Overall, the different structural reforms under consideration are smoothly spread across 
different typologies. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
As for the set of explanatory variables, we consider different types of crisis episodes 
which are measured as dummy variables taking the value of one when a crisis occurs and zero 
otherwise. These variables comprise most notably debt crisis (among which we also 
distinguish between domestic debt crisis and external debt crisis), currency crisis, inflation 
crisis, and banking crisis. The classification and identification of crises episodes is provided 
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2011). 
The set of economic control variables (Econ) includes: a) the dummy variable, 
recession, which takes the value of one if the real GDP growth rate is negative and zero 
otherwise, for which data are retrieved from the World Bank's WDI database; and b) the 
overall KOF globalisation index as provided by Dreher (2006). 
The set of ”political” variables (Pol) includes: a) the Gini coefficient of income 
inequality; and b) the total fractionalization index i.e. the probability that two random draws 
would produce legislators from different parties. Both variables proxy for the intensity of 
distributional conflicts and while the Gini index comes from Standardized World Income 
Inequality Database (SWIID)), the total fractionalization index is provided by the Database of 
Political Institutions (DPI) gathered by Beck et al. (2001). 
Finally, we note that if crisis episodes are followed by structural reforms, then, 
including the contemporaneous values of the explanatory variables in our econometric 
frameworks could imply the existence of endogeneity.
5
 For these reasons, we consider the lag 
of order one of the explanatory variables in throughout the various regressions. 
 
5. Empirical Results 
In the Tables of this Section, the first Column presents the results from a general 
model where we include all economic and political determinants of the likelihood of 
_____________________________ 
5 Indeed, the implementation of structural reforms may lead to a deterioration of specific outcomes in the short-
term, despite their potential improvement over the long-run. In these circumstances, the empirical findings would 
not be tracking the causal relationship between crisis episodes and structural reforms, but the (immediate) costs 
of the implementation instead. We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this interesting issue to us. 
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structural reforms, as well as all crisis episodes. In Column 2, we exclude the crisis episodes 
from the regression, while in Column 3 we consider only the crisis episodes that were 
statistically significant in the general model (i.e. Column 1). This is our baseline model, as it 
allows us to understand which types of crisis dominate the implementation of a specific 
structural reform. In Column 4, we investigate the existence of a nonlinear relationship 
between economic conditions and the likelihood of the implementation of structural reforms 
and, thus, control for the effect of GDP growth by replacing the dummy variable Recession 
with the GDP growth and its square in the set of regressors.
6
 In Column 5, we test whether 
inflation creates a disincentive for the implementation of structural reforms.
7
 To do so, we 
augment our baseline model by including the inflation rate as measured by the annual 
percentage change in the CPI (source: World Bank's WDI dataset). Finally, in Columns 6-7, 
we re-estimate the baseline model for developed (OECD) and developing (non-OECD) 
countries, respectively. In this way, we assess the extent to which our conclusions are similar 
among different groups of countries.  
 
5.1. Financial Reforms 
We start by analysing the determinants of the probability of implementing a financial 
reform. 
Our results are summarized in Table 3. By improving growth prospects, financial 
sector reforms may help mobilizing savings (and, consequently, expanding the availability of 
credit in the economy), but also improving capital allocation (Henry, 2007). These positive 
aspects tend to outweigh the increasing risk-taking behaviour associated with financial 
liberalization (Ranciere et al., 2006). Our findings suggest that financial reforms are speeded 
_____________________________ 
6
 From a theoretical point of view, Aghion and Blanchard (1994) argue that when the level of unemployment is 
low, an increase in unemployment induces more job creation. By contrast, when unemployment is high, a rise in 
unemployment may lead to the destruction of job creation. As a consequence, structural reforms – and, in 
particular, the restructuring of the state sector – are possible only with the support of the insiders and, thus, 
depend on labour market conditions in that a high unemployment can hinder structural reforms. Similarly, 
Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that, rather than hysteresis due to sunk costs, irrationality or risk aversion, it 
is the uncertainty about the distribution of the gains and losses from reforms that can lead to a bias towards the 
status quo. From an empirical perspective, Campos and Horváth (2012a) develop some improved measures of 
economic liberalization across countries and over time and, relying on a set of transition economies, they show 
that structural reforms display a richer dynamics than the one suggested by previous indices. Among the set of 
potential determinants of reforms, these authors consider the economic conditions and, thus, control for changes 
in the GDP growth and the unemployment rate. Bates and Krueger (1993) also argue that there is no need for 
reforms at the time when economic conditions are “reasonably” satisfactory. 
7 The dynamics of GDP growth and inflation are generally linked and there has been a considerable debate on 
the nature of their relationship. Indeed, apart from episodes of very "high" and/or very "low" inflationary 
pressures which are likely to have distortional effects on long-term economic growth whose impacts are difficult 
to discern (Bruno and Easterly, 1996; Blanchard et al., 2010), inflation typically falls during recessions and 
increases over expansions (or economic recoveries). 
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up when economic conditions deteriorate. In fact, it is during periods of recession that 
countries are more prone to make the necessary financial reforms (Nelson, 1990; Bates and 
Krueger, 1993; Williamson and Haggard, 1994). This result has proven to be more evident in 
the group of OECD-countries than in the other. In this context, Krueger (1993) states that 
reforms are undertaken only when the economic environment sufficiently deteriorates and 
triggers a political imperative for pursuing a (long-lasting) better economic performance 
(Tommasi and Velasco, 1996). 
The degree of globalisation or openness to international trade is also fundamental for 
this kind of reforms;
8
 in this case, it is the most important factor for the group of non-OECD 
countries. Saint-Paul (2004) suggests that the increase in trade openness and the subsequent 
rise in the elasticity of labour demand in small open economies narrow the ability of insiders 
to set higher-than-equilibrium wages. This, in turn, generates lower rents and raises the public 
support for institutional changes. Given that these countries‟ financial systems are usually 
under-developed and constrained by underlying structural weaknesses, the more closed they 
are, the more difficult it will be for them to implement the necessary reforms in their financial 
system. When they are more open and integrated in the global market chain, stronger 
competition pushes them to make the necessary reforms to cope with demand pressures from 
the more developed markets.  
Regarding the proxies for the intensity of distributional conflicts (Gini and 
fractionalisation), results are weak, in the sense that only a higher inequality in the 
distribution of income has a marginally significant impact on the likelihood of financial 
reforms. Despite this, the evidence suggests that increasing inequality may trigger financial 
reforms. By fuelling political disaffection, income inequality is typically seen as being at the 
roots of political instability (Agnello et al., 2014d). More specifically, when the income gap 
rises, the increased social pressure and discontentment tend to lead to unstable political 
environments, therefore increasing the likelihood of a government crisis. This, in turn, paves 
the way for governments to pursue long-delayed reforms. 
Some crises have also proven to hasten financial reforms. We find a positive and 
significant impact, especially in the case of external debt and banking crises. Among other 
_____________________________ 
8 Several channels can explain the link between structural reforms and the degree of openness of a country: (i) 
higher openness can act as an automatic stabiliser as it reduces the impact of any reform-driven change in 
domestic demand; (ii) trade openness can amplify the net external demand gains from reforms that lower 
domestic prices and improve external competitiveness, helping to crowd-in demand in small open economies; 
and (iii) insofar as the real exchange rate depreciates and causes a terms of trade loss, the related negative impact 
on household‟s consumption can be larger in more open economies, where imports represent a bigger share of 
domestic demand (Gomes et al., 2011). 
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episodes, banking crises are particularly prone at promoting financial reforms, albeit the 
estimated coefficient is similar to the one associated with external debt crises. This is an 
important result that finds support in the works of Drazen and Grilli (1993), and Drazen and 
Easterly (2001), who show that crises can promote economic reforms (Alesina and Drazen, 
1991; Lora and Oliveira, 2004).
9
 This is particularly true in the group of non-OECD 
countries. As their institutional framework is traditionally underdeveloped, debt and banking 
crises will uncover their weaknesses and force these countries to implement the necessary 
financial reforms. 
Finally, the empirical evidence indicates that economic growth and its square do not 
per se drive the implementation of financial reforms. In fact, the coefficient associated to 
GDP growth is not statistically significant. Additionally, the statistical significance of its 
square is not supportive of the nonlinearity hypothesis. Similarly, the inclusion of inflation 
does not significantly affect the likelihood of structural reforms. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
5.2. Financial Restrictions 
Turning to the financial sector‟s disaggregation, we now look more closely at the 
domestic finance, international capital flow and banking indices. Our results are displayed in 
Tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively. 
Table 4 shows that the outcome of a debt crisis (especially of an external nature) is a 
reasonable boost to the likelihood of a domestic financial reform: the coefficient associated 
with debt crises is positive (0.6-0.7) and statistically significant. The other types of crisis 
episodes have not proven to be relevant to this kind of reform. Moreover, similarly to overall 
financial reforms analysed above, domestic financial reforms are also hasten when economic 
conditions deteriorate, i.e. when a country displays negative growth, especially if it belongs to 
the group of OECD-countries. The degree of globalisation is another influential factor for this 
kind of reforms, once again, with particular emphasis in the group of non-OECD countries. 
We also find that a deepening of the intensity of distributional conflicts - especially 
when proxied by the Gini coefficient - makes domestic financial reforms more prone to take 
place. Thus, an increase in inequality will promote social instability and generate a general 
discontentment which might lead to political instability. Hence, this environment will increase 
_____________________________ 
9 Williamson and Haggard (1994) also points to several examples of reforms that were undertaken in the past 
despite the absence of a crisis (notably, in Australia, Colombia and Portugal). 
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the likelihood of government crises, forcing governments to implement these domestic 
financial reforms, independently of the level of fractionalisation of the political system. 
Our new set of findings also corroborate that economic growth, its square and the 
inflation rate do not have a significant impact on the implementation of domestic financial 
reforms. Moreover, results remain both quantitatively and qualitatively unchanged, 
confirming our previous conclusions. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
With regard to external capital account reforms, the empirical evidence suggests that 
debt crises (irrespectively of their nature) and currency crises do not seem to foster such type 
of liberalization processes, whereas banking and inflation crises do (Table 5). Indeed, while 
the coefficients associated with debt and currency crises are not significant, those associated 
with banking crises and inflation crises are positive and statistically significant (0.83 and 0.57, 
respectively), in line with Alesina and Drazen (1991) and Drazen and Grilli (1993). These 
effects are stronger in the group of non-OECD countries. Price increases are usually 
associated with worsening inequality and poverty levels since, by adding economic 
uncertainty, they erode the incomes of the poorest and limit their ability to borrow and smooth 
consumption over the life cycle (Romer and Romer, 1999; Easterly and Fisher, 2000). In 
particular, hyper-inflation episodes lead independent central banks to tighten the monetary 
policy stance by raising the interest rate and, thereby, inverting the declining movement in 
exchange rates and attracting foreign investors‟ capital to resume investment domestically 
(Haggard and Maxfield, 1996). In fact, countries that experienced hyper-inflation conduct 
policy reforms aimed at regaining price stabilization (Bruno and Easterly, 1996). Moreover, 
such episodes are usually associated with the liberalization of external capital account 
directives and this helps explaining the positive impact that we find on this type of reforms.  
Periods of recession are still presenting some influence on this kind of reforms, but 
only marginally. However, a higher degree of globalisation, distributional conflicts and 
inflation do not seem to have any significant impact on external capital account reforms. In 
the case of GDP growth, the coefficient is negative. This is consistent with the idea that 
during bad times, the probability of implementing reforms increases. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
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Banking sector reforms – summarized in Table 6 – appear to be particularly sensitive 
to the occurrence of external debt crises: the coefficient associated with this dummy variable 
is positive (0.62) and statistically significant. This result is somewhat in contrast with the 
work of Abiad and Mody (2005), who find a negative impact of banking crises on financial 
liberalization and, thus, suggests that an increase in the government control of the financial 
sector is typically a temporary response to this type of crisis. In particular, we observe that 
external debt crises exert pressure on the banking sector, which ultimately forces it to engage 
in the necessary reforms. 
In line with the results for financial reforms, the empirical evidence suggests that 
periods of negative growth, especially in OECD countries, make the implementation of 
banking reforms more likely to take place. A higher degree of globalisation has the same 
effect, and non-OECD countries seem to be the ones that benefit the most from international 
integration. A similar conclusion is obtained when we look at the results for the coefficient on 
the Gini index: there is evidence supporting the role played by distributional issues on the 
probability of a banking reform. Although this type of reforms normally takes place under the 
supervision of a central bank or independent supervisory regulator and, thus, are more likely 
to be adopted without delays (Alesina and Drazen, 1991), we are able to uncover this positive 
effect of income inequality. In fact, worse income distribution tends to raise the social and 
political consensus for banking reforms, which seem to be most required in the group of non-
OECD countries.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
5.3. Trade Reforms, Capital Account Restrictions, Labour Market Regulations and 
Product Market Reforms 
Additionally, we also explore the impact of crises on trade reforms, capital account 
restrictions, labour market regulations and product market reforms. The results are presented 
in Tables 7 to 10, respectively, but little statistically significant effects are found. In 
particular, crises do not appear to contribute to the implementation of any of these reforms. 
Only periods of negative growth and inflation have a positive impact on trade reforms. 
Capital account restrictions are only marginally positively affected by the fractionalisation of 
the political system and negatively by the GDP growth, but labour market regulations and 
product market reforms seem to be exogenous to crises and, more generally, to economic and 
political factors. Nevertheless, product market reforms are hastened by political 
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fractionalisation in OECD countries, while increased income inequality speeds up these 
reforms in non-OECD countries. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
6. Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to assess the sensitivity of our results, we carry out two main robustness 
checks. First, we test whether structural reversals are linked to the same factors explaining the 
reform process (section 6.1). Second, we estimate our models via Instrumental Variable (IV) 
techniques so as to overcome potential endogeneity issues (section 6.2).
10
  
 
6.1. Structural “reversals” 
So far, our study has focused on the economic and political drivers of structural 
reforms. However, attaining the highest possible value of each index may not be necessarily 
always optimal. More generally, knowing which factors induce reform reversals may also be 
interesting from a policy perspective.  
In this context, Dewatripont and Roland (1995) and Alesina and Drazen (2001) 
investigate the political economy of reform packages that have a low probability of reversal. 
Abiad and Mody (2005) show that crises episodes typically lead to more regulation and less 
reform. More specifically, crises in the balance-of-payments tend to foster reforms, while 
banking crises are more prone to generate reversals of liberalization processes. The authors 
also find that the general trend towards liberalization is associated with pressures and 
incentives generated by initial reforms, which increase the need for additional reform and 
stimulate the catching-up with reform leaders. Campos and Horváth (2012b) investigate the 
factors that determine the probability of reform reversals. In particular, the authors show that: 
(i) foreign direct investment makes reversals of privatization less likely to happen; (ii) a 
_____________________________ 
10 We have also estimated a dynamic probit model using a system-GMM framework. The empirical findings 
suggest that the coefficient associated with the lagged dependent variable is statistically significant in five out of 
eight structural reforms. Moreover, the estimates are relatively small in magnitude. This implies that the “long-
term” and the “short-term” effects of the various regressors on the dependent variable are very close to one 
another. As a result, the likelihood of the implementation of a structural reform does not display substantial 
inertia and the estimation of a dynamic probit model does not qualitatively and quantitatively change our main 
conclusions. These results are available upon request. 
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deterioration of the terms of trade and a rise in OECD growth has a positive impact on the 
probability of external liberalization reversals; and (iii) labour strikes raise the likelihood of 
reversals of price liberalization. Campos and Coricelli (2012) identify the political regime as 
one of the main drivers behind the dynamics of financial reforms. Indeed, the authors show 
that partial democracy is a main obstacle to financial reforms. Moreover, when incomplete, 
democratization can cause severe reversals of financial reforms. 
In order to explore this issue, we formulate the definition of “structural reversals”. 
Specifically, each structural reform index is translated into a binary variable, where a negative 
movement denotes a structural reversal, in line with the works of Abiad and Mody (2005) and 
Abiad et al. (2008). Then, we estimate our baseline model for each type of structural reversal. 
Our results are reported in Table 11 and suggest that episodes of negative growth have 
a significant impact on financial, domestic finance, external capital account, banking and 
capital account reversals, but no impact in the other cases. At the same time that periods of 
economic downturns can spur consensus for a reform, they also contribute to a reversal due to 
the deterioration of the economic conditions. Product market reversals are only affected by a 
higher degree of globalisation, which may be due to the influence of external spillovers that 
undermine the underlying domestic structure of more fragile countries. 
When we look at the impact of the intensity of distributional conflicts, we find that 
income inequality affects negatively the likelihood of financial, domestic finance and banking 
reversals, which is consistent with the fact that inequalities generally lead to reforms and not 
to structural reversals. The fractionalisation of the political systems remains irrelevant even 
for structural reversals. 
Finally, we observe that crises do not have any impact on structural reversals. 
Comparing this evidence with the one we obtained above for reforms, we conclude that crises 
have the characteristic of promoting/hastening reforms and never reversals. 
All in all, the lack of statistical significance of a large number of variables (when 
compared to our evidence regarding the likelihood of structural reforms) suggests that 
negative changes in the reform indices are better described as “structural reversals” rather 
than overshoots of the welfare-optimizing points (in which case they would be seen as 
reforms). 
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
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6.2. IV/Endogeneity 
We also estimate the baseline models using an IV-probit estimator where the 
endogenous regressors are instrumented with their own lags. The results reported in Table 12 
are obtained considering that recessions may be endogenous. Two lags are used in the 
different estimations, however, exogeneity tests show that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis.
11
 Even though results for economic and political conditions are weaker, we still 
confirm the important impact that crises have on financial reforms, domestic finance reforms, 
external capital account reforms and banking reforms. It can be seen that the coefficients on 
these variables keep the same statistical significance and sign. Therefore, the empirical 
evidence is robust to the use of different estimation techniques. 
 
[Insert Table 12 here] 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we use data for a panel of developed and developing countries to assess 
the impact of crisis episodes on the likelihood of structural reforms. We find that: (i) external 
debt crises are the main trigger of financial, banking and trade reforms; (ii) inflation and 
banking crises are the key drivers of external capital account reforms; (iii) banking crises also 
hasten financial reforms; and (iv) economic recessions play an important role in promoting 
the necessary consensus for financial, capital, banking and trade reforms, especially in the 
group of OECD-countries. 
Additionally, we show that the degree of globalisation is fundamental for financial 
reforms, in particular for non-OECD countries, as well as trade reforms. Moreover, by 
making distributional conflicts more intense, an increase in the income gap has also proven to 
accelerate the implementation of structural reforms. Furthermore, increased political 
fragmentation speeds up the implementation of product market reforms, particularly in OECD 
countries. 
Our results are generally robust when controlling for either the GDP growth or the 
inflation rate, exploring different sub-samples (OECD versus non-OECD countries) and 
accounting for potential endogeneity concerns. They also suggest that a “downgrade” of the 
reform indices is better characterized as a “structural reversal” and not as an overshoot vis-à-
_____________________________ 
11 As we use lags of the regressors to avoid simultaneity problems, the only explanatory variable that remains 
likely to present some endogeneity is Recession. Nevertheless, results support the hypothesis that it is 
exogenous. The same conclusion is obtained when other variables are assumed to be endogenous (results not 
reported here for reasons of parsimony). 
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vis some optimal level (in which case, the negative change in the reform indices would be 
interpreted as a “reform”). 
In addition to providing valuable information about the impact of different crises on 
the probability of the implementation of structural reforms, this paper opens new avenues for 
further work. For instance, one may want to assess the extent to which crises can act as 
catalysts of institutional changes. We leave this question for future research. 
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Table 2: Number of structural reforms and their relative importance. 
Structural Reforms Number Relative importance (%) 
Financial reforms 345 16.8% 
Domestic finance reforms 340 16.6% 
External capital account reforms 130 6.3% 
Banking sector reforms 328 16.0% 
Trade reforms 279 13.6% 
Capital account restrictions 188 9.2% 
Labour market regulations 233 11.4% 
Product market reforms 207 10.1% 
Total 2050 100% 
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Table 3: The determinants of financial reforms. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Recession 0.429** 0.446** 0.445**  0.441** 0.873*** 0.126 
 (0.217) (0.199) (0.213)  (0.216) (0.327) (0.284) 
Globalisation 0.096** 0.096** 0.098** 0.097** 0.096** 0.014 0.161*** 
 (0.039) (0.037) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.061) (0.053) 
Gini 0.072* 0.062 0.073* 0.076* 0.072* 0.085 0.064 
 (0.043) (0.041) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.067) (0.057) 
Fractionalisation 0.657  0.800 0.763 0.753 1.652 0.416 
 (1.041)  (1.034) (1.046) (1.033) (2.176) (1.224) 
Domestic debt crisis -0.572       
 (0.449)       
External debt crisis 0.485*  0.519** 0.510** 0.512** 0.184 0.541** 
 (0.249)  (0.235) (0.234) (0.237) (0.682) (0.251) 
Currency crisis 0.005       
 (0.206)       
Inflation crisis 0.326       
 (0.249)       
Banking crisis 0.482***  0.485*** 0.513*** 0.471*** 0.413 0.513** 
 (0.171)  (0.170) (0.169) (0.170) (0.282) (0.218) 
Real GDP growth    -0.019    
    (0.024)    
Real GDP growth squared    0.001    
    (0.003)    
Inflation     0.000   
     (0.000)   
Observations 1,103 1,165 1,103 1,103 1,096 518 585 
log-likelihood -522.7 -572.8 -524.4 -523.8 -520.5 -225.3 -295.6 
pseudo-R2 0.0309 0.0122 0.0279 0.0290 0.0272 0.0313 0.0366 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pseudo-R2=1-logL/logL0, where L 
is the likelihood of the model and L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors. 
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Table 4: The determinants of domestic finance reforms. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Recession 0.378* 0.445** 0.451**  0.422* 0.848*** 0.165 
 (0.219) (0.212) (0.214)  (0.217) (0.322) (0.286) 
Globalisation 0.091** 0.092** 0.096** 0.095** 0.096** 0.020 0.151*** 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.062) (0.053) 
Gini 0.106** 0.110** 0.103** 0.105** 0.101** 0.091 0.113** 
 (0.044) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.068) (0.057) 
Fractionalisation 1.388 1.614 1.570 1.507 1.528 1.185 1.677 
 (1.087) (1.088) (1.094) (1.110) (1.092) (2.147) (1.274) 
Domestic debt crisis 0.074       
 (0.438)       
External debt crisis 0.604**  0.691*** 0.681*** 0.662*** 0.437 0.706*** 
 (0.252)  (0.238) (0.237) (0.241) (0.682) (0.255) 
Currency crisis 0.089       
 (0.208)       
Inflation crisis 0.194       
 (0.254)       
Banking crisis 0.228       
 (0.176)       
Real GDP growth    -0.021    
    (0.024)    
Real GDP growth squared    0.002    
    (0.003)    
Inflation     0.000   
     (0.000)   
Observations 1,103 1,103 1,103 1,103 1,096 518 585 
log-likelihood -509.2 -515.0 -510.8 -512.5 -506.1 -220.6 -287.5 
pseudo-R2 0.0294 0.0184 0.0264 0.0231 0.0273 0.0231 0.0379 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pseudo-R2=1-logL/logL0, where L 
is the likelihood of the model and L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors. 
 
 
 36 
Table 5: The determinants of external capital account reforms.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Recession 0.616* 0.763** 0.579*  0.520 -0.106 0.793** 
 (0.324) (0.309) (0.316)  (0.324) (0.686) (0.376) 
Globalisation 0.034 0.051 0.032 0.028 0.037 -0.083 0.071 
 (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.128) (0.074) 
Gini 0.080 0.068 0.074 0.083 0.060 0.102 0.072 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.072) (0.131) (0.087) 
Fractionalisation -0.502 0.144 -0.434 -0.627 -0.435 4.245 -2.411 
 (1.440) (1.411) (1.428) (1.457) (1.430) (3.547) (1.775) 
Domestic debt crisis -0.505       
 (0.682)       
External debt crisis -0.057       
 (0.401)       
Currency crisis -0.163       
 (0.330)       
Inflation crisis 0.955**  0.832** 0.839** 0.867** 1.297* 0.698* 
 (0.387)  (0.353) (0.352) (0.364) (0.751) (0.402) 
Banking crisis 0.591**  0.569** 0.549** 0.488* 0.474 0.718** 
 (0.273)  (0.272) (0.275) (0.276) (0.549) (0.324) 
Real GDP growth    -0.066**    
    (0.031)    
Real GDP growth squared    -0.002    
    (0.005)    
Inflation     0.000   
     (0.000)   
Observations 879 879 879 879 872 354 525 
log-likelihood -203.3 -209.1 -203.8 -203.0 -200.5 -65.03 -135.1 
pseudo-R2 0.0451 0.0174 0.0427 0.0464 0.0460 0.0590 0.0599 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pseudo-R2=1-logL/logL0, where L 
is the likelihood of the model and L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors. 
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Table 6: The determinants of banking sector reforms. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Recession 0.563** 0.603*** 0.610***  0.579*** 1.052*** 0.300 
 (0.221) (0.214) (0.216)  (0.219) (0.322) (0.291) 
Globalisation 0.082** 0.082** 0.086** 0.084** 0.086** 0.024 0.130** 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.064) (0.054) 
Gini 0.085* 0.091** 0.084* 0.088** 0.081* 0.023 0.130** 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.069) (0.060) 
Fractionalisation 1.498 1.647 1.617 1.496 1.572 0.706 1.983 
 (1.116) (1.115) (1.118) (1.140) (1.117) (2.080) (1.313) 
Domestic debt crisis 0.061       
 (0.450)       
External debt crisis 0.563**  0.621** 0.604** 0.590** 0.256 0.653** 
 (0.260)  (0.246) (0.244) (0.249) (0.710) (0.264) 
Currency crisis 0.054       
 (0.216)       
Inflation crisis 0.130       
 (0.264)       
Banking crisis 0.149       
 (0.183)       
Real GDP growth    -0.034    
    (0.024)    
Real GDP growth squared    0.002    
    (0.003)    
Inflation     0.000   
     (0.000)   
Observations 1,103 1,103 1,103 1,103 1,096 518 585 
log-likelihood -481.1 -484.9 -481.7 -484.6 -477.0 -207.3 -271.2 
pseudo-R2 0.0270 0.0193 0.0257 0.0200 0.0266 0.0260 0.0369 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pseudo-R2=1-logL/logL0, where L 
is the likelihood of the model and L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors. 
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Table 7: The determinants of trade reforms. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Recession 0.682** 0.734*** 0.734***  0.612** 0.291 0.877*** 
 (0.266) (0.260) (0.260)  (0.268) (0.617) (0.293) 
Globalisation -0.001 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.000 -0.325** 0.062 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.134) (0.055) 
Gini 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.002 -0.011 0.236 -0.030 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054) (0.053) (0.154) (0.058) 
Fractionalisation 0.966 1.186 1.186 0.934 1.221 -0.052 1.439 
 (1.168) (1.156) (1.156) (1.197) (1.155) (2.986) (1.317) 
Domestic debt crisis 0.169       
 (0.476)       
External debt crisis 0.370       
 (0.283)       
Currency crisis 0.039       
 (0.253)       
Inflation crisis 0.084       
 (0.301)       
Banking crisis 0.352       
 (0.230)       
Real GDP growth    -0.027    
    (0.025)    
Real GDP growth squared    0.006**    
    (0.003)    
Inflation     0.001**   
     (0.000)   
Observations 846 846 846 846 842 250 596 
log-likelihood -302.8 -305.4 -305.4 -306.8 -296.9 -61.62 -238.2 
pseudo-R2 0.0232 0.0147 0.0147 0.0102 0.0291 0.0631 0.0245 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pseudo-R2=1-logL/logL0, where L 
is the likelihood of the model and L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors. 
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Table 8: The determinants of capital account restrictions. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Recession 0.419 0.467 0.467  0.389 0.695 0.330 
 (0.296) (0.288) (0.288)  (0.296) (0.449) (0.377) 
Globalisation -0.016 -0.012 -0.012 -0.013 0.009 0.059 -0.058 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.088) (0.075) 
Gini 0.035 0.041 0.041 0.046 0.035 -0.089 0.107 
 (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.102) (0.073) 
Fractionalisation 2.160* 2.392** 2.392** 2.393* 2.354* 3.417 2.211 
 (1.222) (1.210) (1.210) (1.226) (1.210) (2.464) (1.508) 
Domestic debt crisis 0.369       
 (0.538)       
External debt crisis 0.549       
 (0.354)       
Currency crisis -0.232       
 (0.296)       
Inflation crisis 0.372       
 (0.334)       
Banking crisis 0.227       
 (0.253)       
Real GDP growth    -0.051*    
    (0.029)    
Real GDP growth squared    -0.003    
    (0.004)    
Inflation     0.000   
     (0.000)   
Observations 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,113 1,106 498 615 
log-likelihood -280.6 -284.0 -284.0 -283.0 -280.1 -119.2 -162.8 
pseudo-R2 0.0242 0.0124 0.0124 0.0160 0.0168 0.0248 0.0154 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pseudo-R2=1-
logL/logL0, where L is the likelihood of the model and L0 is the likelihood of the model 
without regressors. 
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Table 9: The determinants of labour market regulations. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Recession -0.219 -0.358 -0.358  -0.414 -0.319 -0.401 
 (0.578) (0.556) (0.556)  (0.567) (0.698) (0.911) 
Globalisation -0.022 -0.008 -0.008 0.006 -0.009 -0.120 0.089 
 (0.074) (0.073) (0.073) (0.074) (0.073) (0.125) (0.100) 
Gini -0.074 -0.078 -0.078 -0.079 -0.073 -0.070 -0.074 
 (0.114) (0.113) (0.113) (0.112) (0.112) (0.141) (0.191) 
Fractionalisation 0.088 0.336 0.336 0.981 0.353 4.377 -1.973 
 (2.167) (2.175) (2.175) (2.247) (2.191) (4.352) (2.634) 
Domestic debt crisis 0.622       
 (1.476)       
External debt crisis 1.175       
 (0.837)       
Currency crisis 0.196       
 (0.408)       
Inflation crisis -0.483       
 (0.692)       
Banking crisis -0.209       
 (0.583)       
Real GDP growth    0.071    
    (0.075)    
Real GDP growth squared    -0.019*    
    (0.010)    
Inflation     0.020   
     (0.023)   
Observations 339 339 339 339 339 189 150 
log-likelihood -134.9 -136.4 -136.4 -134.2 -136.0 -70.09 -64.44 
pseudo-R2 0.0146 0.00358 0.00358 0.0196 0.00665 0.0210 0.0138 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pseudo-R2=1-
logL/logL0, where L is the likelihood of the model and L0 is the likelihood of the model 
without regressors. 
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Table 10: The determinants of product market reforms. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Recession -0.484 -0.414 -0.414  -0.415 -0.721 -0.296 
 (0.351) (0.343) (0.343)  (0.348) (0.569) (0.462) 
Globalisation 0.063 0.071 0.071 0.069 0.073 0.079 0.079 
 (0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.070) (0.077) 
Gini 0.061 0.058 0.058 0.055 0.059 -0.140 0.277*** 
 (0.065) (0.065) (0.065) (0.064) (0.065) (0.092) (0.104) 
Fractionalisation 1.214 1.362 1.362 1.185 1.382 4.154* -0.459 
 (1.445) (1.446) (1.446) (1.516) (1.445) (2.216) (2.106) 
Domestic debt crisis 0.398       
 (0.599)       
External debt crisis -0.290       
 (0.381)       
Currency crisis 0.017       
 (0.291)       
Inflation crisis 0.179       
 (0.357)       
Banking crisis 0.196       
 (0.254)       
Real GDP growth    0.003    
    (0.034)    
Real GDP growth squared    0.001    
    (0.005)    
Inflation     0.000   
     (0.000)   
Observations 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,097 1,090 566 531 
log-likelihood -301.3 -302.1 -302.1 -302.9 -299.4 -155.4 -140.4 
pseudo-R2 0.0109 0.00801 0.00801 0.00548 0.00821 0.0253 0.0326 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pseudo-R2=1-
logL/logL0, where L is the likelihood of the model and L0 is the likelihood of the model 
without regressors. 
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Table 11:  The determinants of structural reversals. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Financial Domestic External capital Banking Trade Capital Labour Product 
 reforms finance account sector reforms account market market 
  reforms reforms reforms  restrictions regulations reforms 
Recession 1.182*** 0.855* 1.280*** 0.842* 0.090 1.460*** 0.108 -16.613 
 (0.432) (0.508) (0.455) (0.501) (0.377) (0.428) (0.459) (3816.004) 
Globalisation -0.145 -0.179 -0.046 -0.186 -0.069 0.083 0.012 0.496** 
 (0.101) (0.118) (0.127) (0.114) (0.073) (0.114) (0.060) (0.215) 
Gini -0.319*** -0.253** -0.085 -0.243** -0.093 0.098 0.209* -0.009 
 (0.103) (0.100) (0.107) (0.098) (0.076) (0.113) (0.111) (0.322) 
Fractionalization -1.133 -3.253 1.050 -4.126 -0.302 0.302 -1.041 13.130 
 (2.307) (2.589) (2.558) (2.520) (1.511) (2.101) (1.808) (16.649) 
External debt crisis -0.145 -0.095  0.076     
 (0.474) (0.536)  (0.515)     
Inflation crisis   0.175      
   (0.491)      
Banking crisis -0.136  0.330      
 (0.374)  (0.418)      
Observations 634 480 451 505 663 498 360 136 
log-likelihood -113.1 -86.28 -82.91 -91.58 -178.8 -90.04 -171.6 -13.06 
pseudo-R2 0.0795 0.0698 0.0566 0.0700 0.00695 0.0637 0.0128 0.209 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pseudo-R2=1-logL/logL0, where L is the 
likelihood of the model and L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors. 
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Table 12: The determinants of structural reforms - IV-Probit model estimation. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Financial Domestic External capital Banking Trade Capital Labour Product 
 reforms finance account sector reforms account market market 
  reforms reforms reforms  restrictions regulations reforms 
Recession 0.522 0.729 0.125 0.412 0.666 1.026** -2.274 -0.582 
 (0.653) (0.651) (0.952) (0.704) (0.636) (0.524) (4.558) (0.731) 
Globalisation 0.056** 0.052* 0.018 0.048* 0.019 0.005 -0.026 0.036 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.031) (0.026) (0.030) (0.021) (0.035) (0.022) 
Gini 0.032 0.053** 0.015 0.045* -0.013 0.024 -0.039 0.033 
 (0.027) (0.022) (0.028) (0.027) (0.035) (0.024) (0.083) (0.031) 
Fractionalization 0.498 0.915 -0.211 1.124 1.187* 1.045 0.579 0.836 
 (0.622) (0.632) (0.898) (0.707) (0.674) (0.828) (1.225) (0.788) 
External debt crisis 0.231* 0.284**  0.300**     
 (0.133) (0.121)  (0.117)     
Inflation crisis   0.511***      
   (0.138)      
Banking crisis 0.274**  0.359**      
 (0.137)  (0.161)      
Observations 1,074 1,074 1,074 1,074 1,148 1,189 367 1,167 
log-likelihood -862.6 -847.4 -510.8 -815.3 -707.5 -640.4 -214.8 -656.0 
Exogeneity test 0.26 0.58 0.03 0.02 0.31 2.17 0.13 0.40 
 [0.607] [0.446] [0.863] [0.891] [0.576] [0.141] [0.715] [0.525] 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. pseudo-R2=1-logL/logL0, where L is the 
likelihood of the model and L0 is the likelihood of the model without regressors. For the Wald test of 
exogeneity, we report the observed value and the respective p-value in square brackets. 
 
 
 
